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Reflections on the key economic questions in the 
Scottish Independence Referendum  
Andrew Goudie
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Abstract 
This paper reflects on the key economic questions of the Scottish Independence Referendum that should 
continue to be a political priority and sit at the heart of the debate.  It poses the critical issues upon which 
the political leaderships should focus and provide greater insight and clarity into their thinking.  These 
central questions range from the fundamental nature of economic self-determination to the high-profile 
and, arguably, primary economic choice of which currency system a newly independent Scotland would 
wish to adopt.  It also focuses on the meaning of independence and dependence, and on the choices 
and trade-offs that must be faced. It finally draws out the importance of viewing the Referendum as an 
irreversible process and the need to assess all the constitutional propositions in a systematic manner 
with a particular emphasis upon their long term value. 
I Introduction. 
In the early days of the Scottish Independence Referendum debate, many commentators argued that the 
poor quality of the exchanges was, in part, due to the paucity of the underlying analysis of the 
constitutional alternatives and the possible economic systems that might be adopted.  Over recent 
months, this picture has changed and a wide range of thinking has now been published to inform the 
debate
2
.  The valuable articles that appeared in this Commentary in March 2014
3
 were one such 
contribution.  The constitutional models founded on political independence have, quite appropriately, 
received considerable attention.  In contrast, the alternative options of enhanced evolution within the UK
4
 
have so far been poorly articulated, largely due to the weakness of the underlying thinking and analysis.   
Naturally, some contributions have had explicitly political origins and, given the realities of political 
debate, were bound to reach predictable conclusions that supported the author’s cause.  It would, 
however, be a mistake to discard these pieces since most, nonetheless, contain helpful insights into the 
primary issues.   Other contributors have had more objective origins and, as such, their work has taken 
on a greater standing.  In general, the political challenge is to now make a more productive and 
considered use of all these contributions, particularly the latter. 
In essence, it can be argued that the principal questions that should be confronted in the Referendum 
debate have now been identified, but there have been few areas of convergence between the 
protagonists.  Unsurprisingly, the intensity of the interaction in the present political context and the 
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extensive uncertainty about many key parameters in the post-Referendum world necessarily make such 
convergence highly unlikely. 
The reflections in this paper
5,6
 are therefore focused on the key economic questions that, arguably, 
should continue to sit at the heart of the debate over the remainder of the campaign and which, 
notwithstanding the earlier comments, still deserve to be a political priority.  Much has been said and 
written by the political leaderships
7
 over the past year, but rarely with a sharp focus on these questions 
and on rigorously argued explanations that would provide greater insight into these challenges.  In the 
absence of this clarity, it appears that an otherwise confused electorate will find great difficulty in 
assessing the constitutional alternatives currently on offer.   
II The key economic questions. 
In some key respects, the debate has clearly moved on.   Whether for perceived political expediency and 
political advantage or on account of the economic and financial evidence, few now contest the capacity 
of an independent Scotland to be sustainable and indeed succeed in the global economy.  The issue 
now is focussed much more sharply on how successful it would be over the long term – and, particularly, 
in comparison to the continuance of Scotland within the UK – and on how smooth would be the transition 
to a sustainable state and with what interim costs?    Even those who have serious reservations about 
the economic prosperity that might ensue from an independent Scotland are careful to avoid the political 
minefield of seeming to suggest that Scots are not competent to run their own affairs or are trapped in a 
state of dependency with the UK that cannot be broken. 
There are a set of key economic questions that remain fundamental to the debate: 
1. The Fundamental Political Economy Perspective.  Underlying the basic constitutional 
question faced by the people of Scotland lies a critical choice:    is the pre-eminent issue…    
 
under which constitutional arrangement, whether based on enhanced powers within the UK or 
on political independence, will I be economically better off? 
…   or, is it ...   
irrespective of my precise future economic circumstances, do I wish national self-determination 
– albeit one that will be constrained in significant ways by the reality of the global economy, and 
by any monetary union that we may enter  -  to drive my economic future?     
 
The political prominence accorded to one or other of these key questions is clearly shaped by the 
strategic approach of the two campaigns and by where they feel the greatest political advantage might 
be gained.  In part, this is driven by what the available evidence might be suggesting and whether it 
appears to favour or challenge a specific constitutional preference.  Equally, the apparent lack of robust 
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and high-quality evidence and the dominance of risk and uncertainty are also strong motivators of the 
political preference for emphasizing one or other of these.   
Survey work
8
 has suggested that the electorate does, indeed, see the economy as the key issue.  Voters 
would apparently be significantly more likely to support a politically independent Scotland if they were 
£500 better off than if they were £500 worse off
9
.  Interestingly, therefore, this tends to suggest that 
economic self-determination – rooted in a sense of national identity and nationhood - is less important 
than certain economic benefit.   However, herein lies the paradox:  while people may wish to see the 
economy – and, notably, their personal economic benefit – as the critical and decisive determinant of the 
outcome of the Referendum, it is an area of inevitable uncertainty and indeed speculation, as we 
consider further below.   The knowledge base is simply too weak to provide the clarity that allows this to 
be the central issue upon which the electorate can form a considered and informed judgement.  At the 
macroeconomic level, there is no convincing evidence of the relative benefit to economic growth of the 
two differing constitutional arrangements currently before the electorate.   Indeed, there are similar 
weaknesses in assessing the net impact – and thus credibility - of particular policy promises or the 
priorities of individual governments and political parties, whether in areas as diverse as income tax, 
corporation tax, specific welfare programmes or particular universal benefits. 
So, how is this paradox to be resolved?   If people feel that their major concern is going unanswered – 
whether because it is unanswerable at this time or because the answers are riddled with apparent 
contradiction, confusion and complexity that leaves them none the wiser – the issue will be:  what then 
drives people‟s thinking instead?  Will people adopt a broader understanding of their likely economic net 
benefit that, for example, encompasses the benefits from the public services that they enjoy or the 
benefit they derive from the potential gains in their environmental and equity perspectives?    
The fundamental vision and generosity of the welfare system has been a prominent issue in this regard, 
with the argument hinging on the nature of the underlying values of Scottish society.  Indeed, it highlights 
a key question in the debate:  are fundamental Scottish values substantively distinct in a wide range of 
areas of economic, social and environmental life from those prevailing across the UK as a whole and, if 
they are, have they been sustained – and appear likely to remain sustained – over many decades?  If 
they are shown to be such, then the case for greater self-determination and powers and, in extremis, 
political independence, is significantly more compelling.  The European elections of May 2014 and, 
specifically, the political response to the apparent – and now realized – attraction of UKIP to the UK 
electorate has provided a further clear example of this point.  Is Scotland fundamentally – both in the 
sense of the view being dominant across society and held consistently over the long term  -  distinct from 
the rest of the UK in its attitudes to both immigration and to political and economic union with the EU?    
Three additional points are important here.  Firstly, it is worth noting that the motivation of economic self-
determination is relevant to the options founded on both independence and enhanced devolution, 
although clearly to differing degrees and probably with differing degrees of future reversibility or 
refinement.  Secondly, the “£500 debate”, while dismissed by many as absurdly simplistic and superficial 
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in a debate of such immense importance, does at least throw the limelight onto an outcomes 
perspective, albeit one that is extremely limited.  Ultimately, the economic value of constitutional change 
is about the potential impact on the outcomes that determine the lives and well-being of the people of 
Scotland and, some would argue, of all the people of the UK and indeed the wider global community.   
And, finally, it is worth noting that, if people are indeed motivated by personal economic outcomes, then, 
while the technical debate may seem dry and obscure, it is, nonetheless, pivotal. 
2. The Choice of Fundamental Economic System.   Recent months have revealed an emerging 
consensus that Scotland’s currency choice is the key challenge.  This single decision has such far-
reaching ramifications for the definition of the entire economic system that, while a careful analysis of the 
individual policies that each currency choice might permit or necessitate is important, ultimately, we must 
revert to the most basic and, arguably, the first decision that should be determined:  the currency 
question.    In essence, the crux is:  firstly, which currency system would best facilitate the attainment of 
society‟s primary objectives and, secondly, which constitutional arrangement would facilitate the currency 
system that Scotland would therefore prefer?     
 
There are, of course, other key dimensions critical to the definition of the economic system – as, for 
example, with the fundamental choice of the basic level of public sector expenditure, relative to its 
output, that the nation wishes to establish – but the focus here is upon the currency question. 
 
Formal sterling currency union.  The striking interventions with regard to the prospects for a formal 
sterling currency area by the UK Chancellor, other senior pro-union politicians and the Scottish First 
Minister in February 2014
10
, and the subsequent furore that they sparked, demonstrated the centrality of 
the currency question. The apparently unambiguous declaration by the pro-union leaders that an 
independent Scotland would not be able to formally adopt sterling invites many critical questions.  If this 
position is seen as credible and an irreversible UK policy stance, then the advocates of independence 
necessarily will be under immense pressure to define a new currency position that they can - or, more 
probably can - deliver.  If this pro-union position is seen as unsustainable and reversible, not least in the 
face of an actual decision by the people of Scotland to support independence, then little has changed.  It 
will be the post-Referendum negotiations that are crucial.  
 
The Osborne et al intervention has been portrayed by the pro-independence campaign as typical of 
heavy-handed Westminster pro-unionists, and by the pro-union campaign as a necessary contribution to 
the debate to inform the Scottish people of the post-Referendum reality if the vote were to back 
independence.   Perhaps, most importantly here will be the popular mood across the rest of the UK in the 
event of a vote for Scottish independence.   If UK public opinion were hostile to Scotland remaining 
within a formal currency union, then the issue will turn on whether the UK Government at that time – 
assuming it was indeed prepared, in principle, to reverse its current position in the cold light of day 
following the vote, which is, of course, inevitably uncertain – was willing to go against the prevailing 
popular mood in the remaining UK.  This is potentially a far more serious challenge for a newly 
independent Scotland wishing to set up a formal sterling area.    How this popular view evolves will be 
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key and will no doubt reflect the closeness of the vote, the underlying attitudes towards Scotland, the 
perceptions of the costs and benefits of Scotland to the rest of the UK and the atmosphere created by 
the political classes and media at the time. 
 
The popular mood and the consequent stance of the UK parties post-Referendum will be brought all the 
more sharply into focus in the light of the imminent UK elections in May 2015.   It is highly probable that 
all the UK parties will be obliged to be explicit in their manifestos about their proposed stance in the post-
Referendum negotiations in the event of a pro-independence vote.  Reflecting the popular view will 
therefore be a crucial element.   
 
However, there are deeper issues at stake here.  For example, even if the current UK Government’s 
position is indeed final and an informal sterling area emerged, there is still the key question of whether 
global financial markets would find this a long term, credible situation, or would they behave as if the 
informal arrangement were in fact quasi-formal.  In the event of a financial crisis in Scotland
11
, for 
instance, would the rest of the UK - in an informal sterling union - stand aside and not provide support, 
even when there was a UK self-interest in a stable currency union?  In other words, from a UK 
perspective, what risks would be generated by Scottish participation in an informal union?  Given that the 
Scottish economy constitutes almost 10% of the present UK economy, a share significantly in excess of 
the size of Hong Kong or Panama relative to the Dollar zone, would the UK not wish, in reality, to have 
an up-front agreement that provided some ex ante reassurance about the conduct of Scottish policy? 
 
Moreover, from a Scottish perspective, just how different would an informal sterling zone be from a 
formal sterling monetary union?  Some argue that Scotland would de facto be equally subject to the UK's 
monetary policy under either scenario.  
 
Interestingly, while the UK self-interest in a continuing sterling monetary union, that included an 
independent Scotland, has been strongly asserted as a clear reason for the UK agreeing to such a 
formal union, the case has been advanced primarily on the basis of the increase in transaction costs
12
 
that would be imposed on UK businesses, consumers and visitors were Scotland compelled to adopt a 
non-sterling currency.   Important though transaction costs would undoubtedly be
13
, this consideration is 
dwarfed by the far greater concerns regarding the fundamental stability of the sterling union and the 
costs that might be incurred were the union to prove unsustainable and unstable.  It is here that the UK 
pro-union advocates see the greatest threat to the UK interest.   Events in the EU since 2009 have only 
served to heighten these fears.    
 
Similarly, the UK dependence on the strength of Scottish trade and exports – and, especially, Scottish 
North Sea oil assets - has often been cited as an important factor in the UK interest. This analysis begs 
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the question of who actually owns the North Sea assets that are being exploited and who benefits from 
the profits
14
:  to where is the profit directed…… to within Scotland, the UK, the USA or elsewhere?  And, 
moreover, would the North Sea assets be actually traded in sterling?    It is also interesting to consider 
that, while there may be monetary policy arguments for a strong currency, few economies in practice are 
unhappy to see their competitiveness enhanced through modest depreciation.  Indeed, many have 
argued that, if the benefits of the North Sea were to accrue primarily to Scotland, the UK would not be 
averse to seeing its currency weaken to facilitate the development of other tradable sectors.  The UK 
interest here is therefore not clear-cut. 
 
On the other hand, it has been argued forcefully by some throughout the Referendum campaign that the 
currently constituted UK is the best global example of a successful optimal currency area, that has 
developed over the centuries to become a very highly integrated and prosperous economic zone.  It 
would seem inconsistent, therefore, for the UK to rush to dismantle such an effective currency union if, 
indeed, a stable union could be agreeably established to the mutual benefit of both economies, difficult 
though that might prove to be.   
 
The refusal of the pro-independence camp to countenance anything other than a formal sterling area, 
largely for fear of opening up an area of debate that would expose it to considerable challenge about the 
feasibility and value of the alternatives, which it would not welcome, is both striking and critical to the 
Referendum.   Similarly, the blunt rejection of a formal sterling union by the pro-union camp in its effort to 
starkly expose the massive risks, as they see it, from independence, has had an equivalent effect.   
 
Both stances have effectively killed the prospect for further meaningful debate of the alternative options.  
The apparent choice before the electorate is a simple one:  either sterling within the political union or 
sterling with independence, formally agreed and negotiated with the UK Government.  In this regard, the 
pro-independence camp has been relatively successful.  Whether the present stance of the three pro-
union leaders is a bluff or not, the pro-independence camp has – so far – avoided a highly problematic 
debate about alternative currency plans, one which would raise very significant questions of future risk 
and uncertainty.   In contrast, the pro-union camp has not, to date, dispelled the view that a formal 
currency union is, in fact, possible and that the more extreme risks of independence are therefore 
avoidable. 
 
What would seem almost certain is that, post-Referendum, were there to be a majority in favour of 
independence, there would be negotiations between the new Scottish administration and the UK 
administration about the future currency and any transitional process.  It would seem inconceivable that, 
given the present, deeply-embedded role of sterling across the UK, a future UK Government could 
refuse to at least discuss the conditions under which a formal sterling area would be acceptable to them.   
 
That these conditions might ultimately prove unacceptable to Scotland is a different, though critical, 
point.   
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  This issue has recently emerged in the wider discussion about the underlying wealth of the Scottish economy in the 
light of the high levels of overseas ownership of businesses in many of Scotland‟s key sectors, such as oil and gas, 
financial services and whisky.  
 The nature of the UK’s preferences with respect to such conditionality are considered further, later in this 
paper, but the key point is to identify the perceived risks about which the UK would be most concerned 
and understand the form that its conditions might indeed take.   The UK interest would primarily appear 
to focus on the regulation and control of the banking system and the tightness and discipline embedded 
in a set of fiscal rules that shaped fiscal policy at both the aggregate and detailed policy level.  If 
conditionality could be designed in such a way that it were deemed appropriate by a UK administration, 
why would the UK then reject a formal agreement, not least since the UK would no doubt see benefits to 
itself from, for example, averting the prospect of an independent Scotland adopting a more competitive 
exchange rate or tax regime, or contributing less than proportionately (in UK eyes) to its continuing 
adjustment programme and to the unravelling of the quantitative easing programmes
15
? 
 
At present, the political context is dominated by the apparent rejection by the pro-union parties of a 
formal sterling currency union.  Paradoxically, if negotiations were to take place following a yes vote, 
then it is easy to see that it might be the newly-independent Scottish administration that rejects a formal 
currency union. 
 
It also would seem obvious that, if establishing a formal sterling area proves impossible because the two 
governments are unable to converge on a workable agreement, the pro-independence camp would be 
prepared for an alternative currency arrangement.  While preparations now might not be conducted 
openly, it would be extraordinary if the Scottish Government were not already thinking about and 
preparing for this potential outcome.  Failure to do so would risk either a further period of damaging 
uncertainty or an ill-thought out leap to an alternative without the necessary preparation. 
 
Informal currency union.  The other currency options have not generated any extensive exchange, 
especially at the political level.   To most, it appears that it is self-evident that both a new Scottish 
currency – whether free floating or pegged to another currency, such as sterling - and membership of the 
euro area are indisputably second best choices.   Either the economic or political risks, or both, are 
overwhelming.    
 
One exception to this constrained currency debate has been the recent discussion, led by John Kay
16
, 
around Scottish participation within an informal sterling area.   In principle, such a system could be 
operated and, as he notes, in the present global economy, business already transacts in any currency of 
its choosing. There is, nonetheless, “no precedent for an advanced country with a sophisticated financial 
system choosing voluntarily but unilaterally to share another country‟s money”.   
 
The pros and cons of an informal currency union are well demonstrated in other economies that have 
adopted such a system.  Foremost, Scotland would not have control or influence over UK monetary 
policy, but many have argued that this is the case even within a formal currency union, as far as a much 
more junior partner is concerned.  Similarly, others have pointed to the absence of the lender of last 
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resort role of the Bank of England as too big a price for informal union.  However, as has been pointed 
out elsewhere
17
, the lender of last resort role has not been fully understood in the Referendum debate.  
Such a role certainly does have benefits in some circumstances of financial stress, but responsibility for 
failed financial institutions does not fall solely on the host nation, as many commentators seem to 
assume without question: where the bulk of the operations of a failing Scottish bank were to lie in other 
economies and other jurisdictions, it is those nations that would bear the majority of the burden of 
resolution
18
.  Certainly, an independent Scotland would have responsibility to guarantee Scottish 
depositors, but this would not extend to the unilateral and unlimited bail out of every Scottish financial 
institution. 
 
Importantly, the informal use of sterling overcomes one big challenge compared to the option of adopting 
a pegged or a floating exchange rate: namely, there is a smaller challenge in establishing the 
permanence of the currency arrangement and the credibility of the set rate, unless, of course, the 
informal union is, itself, seen as temporary.   With an informal union, short term speculation would be 
expected to be minimal, providing it is indeed seen to be credible and there is thus a minimal risk of 
capital flight. 
 
The pegged currency option.  Interestingly, the pegged currency option probably deserves more 
attention, not least for an eventuality in which a formal sterling union option might indeed be ruled out 
either by the UK Government or by a newly independent Scotland were the conditions demanded by a 
UK Government to be deemed economically or politically too restrictive and one-sided. 
 
A pegged currency has several potential attributes that might make it attractive.  Superficially, there 
might be seen to be significant political mileage in a newly independent nation having its own currency.  
More substantively, Scotland having its own currency might be seen over the longer term as paving the 
way both politically and economically for a move towards adopting the euro, once the latter had been 
placed on a far more sustainable footing.  On Day 1, an independent Scotland would be expected to 
continue within the existing currency union, but a decision to adopt a pegged exchange rate in due 
course would precipitate a process to establish the necessary economic and financial institutions.  These 
institutions would, moreover, provide a significant long term advantage, as, were any subsequent 
decision in future years taken to abandon the peg for any reason, the institutional framework would 
already be in place and have proved its operational capacity.    
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highly relevant here. 
From the UK’s perspective, there are also clear advantages which would go some way to alleviate the 
present concerns that have apparently motivated the decision to rule out a formal sterling area.  Namely, 
with a peg, there would be a major transference of risk from the UK to Scotland.  The UK would be 
expected to support a peg against speculative activity but not against any fundamental disequilibrium 
that it perceived.  Moreover, to the extent that sustained speculation might itself induce a more 
permanent disequilibrium, the UK authorities would be expected to limit their support in this eventuality.  
The UK could therefore walk away from a peg at any time, leaving the primary risks with Scotland.  
Unlike the formal sterling area option, therefore, where the UK perceives the risk to still reside with itself, 
that risk is largely eliminated with a peg.  There is thus a major incentive for Scottish policy to be 
designed to satisfy the international financial markets if Scotland wishes the peg to operate in a stable 
and sustainable manner. 
 
On the other hand, a pegged currency may be seen as a quasi-monetary union, with all that that implies 
for monetary and fiscal policy: it shares many attributes of an informal sterling area, albeit one that is 
based on two pegged currencies.    In addition, the obvious disadvantage that is embedded in this model 
is, of course, that the stability of the peg critically depends on the credibility of Scotland’s monetary and 
fiscal policies and a strong underlying belief in the absolute sustainability of the peg and the established 
rate.  As was seen within the euro zone in 2012, even with a single currency relatively well established, 
any suggestion that the Drachma might be re-established was sufficient to precipitate the markets to 
adopt immediate risk mitigation – typically entailing major currency in/outflows - with immensely 
damaging implications and self-fulfilling expectations.  The expectations in Greece’s case were only 
thwarted by the weight of potential German support:  a clear distinction from the context in which any peg 
would operate between Scotland and the UK. 
 
Few economists appear to dissent from the view that Scotland and the rest of the UK together form a 
very good approximation to an optimal currency area
19
.   Moreover, a change of constitutional state 
would not be anticipated to change that view in the foreseeable future, even if, over the long term, this 
might be less clear.  Consequently, it can be argued from this perspective that the heart of the currency 
debate should be about the conditions that would - or could - create sustainability and mutual benefit 
within a common currency area, not about second-level concerns and not drowned under the noise of 
political manoeuvring.  It could be argued that -  with appropriately designed institutions, mutually 
acceptable directives on the operation of key policies, appropriate risk sharing and oversight, and the 
pooling of sovereignty, amongst other key elements  - a mutually beneficial currency union might be 
constructed. As was noted above, the key point is whether or not the terms of such an arrangement 
would be agreeable to all parties and whether or not it would be preferable to having no agreement. 
 
Understanding the alternative currency options
20
 that might need to be pursued for any of the reasons 
outlined above would seem a prudent step for both parties in entering a transitional stage of preparation 
for independence.  The political reality is that this will, however, simply not happen openly pre-
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Referendum.  The prospective cost to both the pro-union and pro-independence camps of negotiating on 
their current currency stances would appear immense:  further meaningful debate of the alternatives 
would thus appear politically inconceivable at present. 
 
 
3. The Nature of Independence.  Inherent in this third key question is the heart of the 
constitutional debate:  to what extent does political independence facilitate meaningful and substantive 
economic independence?; and are currency union options necessarily constrained, since both monetary 
and fiscal policy are inevitably limited by the conditions imposed on the union by the members of that 
union?    The recent intervention by the Governor the Bank of England
21
, though carefully crafted to 
avoid overt political comment, was nonetheless insightful in demonstrating his view that the effective and 
sustainable working of a monetary union necessitates a high degree of coordination and collaboration.  
He argued for a relatively sophisticated pre-determination of the rules that would shape behaviour within 
the union and, importantly, a high degree of risk-sharing and risk-pooling within the union
22
, with all that 
that implies for the sovereignty of the two states.   In the present political climate, it is difficult to see UK 
Ministers rejecting the Governor’s perspective.  
   
It would seem inevitable that any formal monetary union would entail a complex negotiation in which the 
nature of the conditionality, imposed on each other by the membership, was determined.  In this 
circumstance, the relative power and influencing capacity of the partners to the monetary union are 
central to the strategic and policy outcomes that emerge.  In general, as other such unions have 
demonstrated, the most powerful economic participants yield by far the greatest influence.  Thus, the 
independence of the smaller interests is certainly likely to be circumscribed.   The key question in the 
event of a pro-independence vote, in which a formal sterling monetary union is the preferred option, is 
therefore:   are the perceived benefits of the monetary union sufficiently great as to outweigh the 
perceived constraints and conditionality of the union, or, is the newly gained political independence seen 
to be too heavily compromised  -  and the proposed conditionality deemed both politically and 
economically unacceptable -  such that an alternative option is preferred? 
4. Choices and Trade Offs.    One element of the constitutional challenge that has been largely 
lost in the political exchanges to date has been the simple observation that no single constitutional option 
provides an unambiguously better opportunity.     All options entail choices and trade-offs.   
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   The type of agreed framework that has been advocated embraces critical areas of economic and financial policy, 
such as: 
 A banking union, encompassing a common regulatory framework for the financial sector, common 
procedures for resolution, a pooled system of deposit insurance and guarantee, the necessary facilities for 
the Central Bank to act as lender of last resort, and structures and regulations that enabled the decoupling 
of the banking system from the sovereign, deemed necessary for times of financial crisis; 
 Some form of fiscal facility with substantial resources to facilitate fiscal risk-sharing, the implementation of 
stabilisation policy, including the key automatic stabilisers,  and an equalisation role; 
 A shared fiscal arrangement, embracing a set of agreed fiscal rules to provide reassurance to all the parties 
that would bear risk within the union; 
 Monetary policy union, including interest rate policy and any monetary easing policy,  These would be set 
by the Bank of England, according to a remit provide by the UK Parliament.    
Continuance of the union necessarily implies that some policy decisions taken in Westminster will be less 
directly appropriate for Scotland: quite obviously, one-size-doesn't-always-fit-all perfectly.  If UK interest 
rates rise rapidly in the coming couple of years to counter a housing boom that is concentrated in the 
South East, then this clearly is not directly promoting recovery in a Scotland with a much softer housing 
market.  However, whether the overall net benefit of full autonomy (which may, for example, bring with it 
a greater vulnerability to external shocks) exceeds the overall net benefit to Scotland of being within the 
UK (without – in this example - the autonomy to set its own interest rates) is the key point.  This is a 
complex issue to resolve as demonstrated in this example which illustrates an asymmetric shock to the 
UK.   There are two key questions here: firstly, what degree of interest policy autonomy would an 
independent Scotland, in fact, have
23
 and, secondly, equally, to what degree would the union, in reality, 
protect Scotland from external shocks.   
Similarly, as a second example, it would seem unwise to fight the apparent reality that Scottish oil 
production is set to fall, as new investment slows the rate of decline but does not arrest it, and that an 
independent Scotland is, therefore, likely to be more vulnerable on this count than being within the UK.  
This apparent fact is, however, constitutionally neutral: it is not itself sufficient to undermine 
independence.  It should prompt a vigorous debate about how, with independence, both the declining 
contribution of oil might be managed and how this might be mitigated and at what cost this might be 
done.   These are the insights that should inform the debate since managing this inevitable set of risks is 
the key issue, not the decline in oil production per se.  In essence, there is a key choice to be made with 
respect to the autonomy (with perhaps greater vulnerability) versus risk-pooling and risk-sharing (with 
fewer degrees of economic self-determination) trade-off. 
The general concern here should be that the assessment of the constitutional choices has been dogged 
by piecemeal and partial analysis that has failed to capture the economic reality.  Of course, a lower 
Scottish corporate tax rate, cet par, is likely to benefit Scotland
24
.  Of course, retaining the 
disproportionately high flows of research resources from the UK Government to Scotland is a major 
benefit to Scotland.  But just as the former cannot, in isolation, make the case for an independent 
Scotland, so the latter does not, in isolation, make the case for the union.   
The most prominent and critical macroeconomic decision about the currency choice makes the point 
equally strikingly.   The UK rejection of a formal sterling monetary union rests heavily in the argument 
that an economic system will not be stable if it embraces a monetary and banking union, but not a fiscal 
union.  Some argue, of course, that it requires a political union. The Governor of the Bank of England 
and the European Union appear to broadly share this belief.  If stability does, in fact, necessitate this 
complex set of unions, then an independent Scotland faces a stark choice between a relatively highly 
constrained independence within a formal union or adopting its own currency.  There would be no real-
world option of currency union with an unconstrained fiscal policy, for example.  Certainly, the aggregate 
fiscal stance within a currency union would appear very likely to be constrained but, similarly, it is not 
improbable that the detail of fiscal policy may be limited, not least with concerns over tax competition and 
the like.  Of course, the existence of this trade-off would be contested by some.  They would argue that 
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    Darby el al (2014),  Natural Geography, Firm Location and the Corporation Tax Debate, Fraser of Allander 
Economic Commentary Vol 38, (1), June 2014. 
 
fiscal autonomy within a currency union is indeed possible and would be their intended arrangement.  
Only post-Referendum negotiations will resolve the degree to which this trade-off exists but the 
indications are that it will not be an uncontested area of debate at that time. 
Ultimately, these examples beg the same critical question of what the totality of any constitutional 
proposition might look like:  is one single preferred policy worth having, given the other costs - and 
benefits - that would necessarily be part of the proposition?    In other words, what policy configurations 
are, in fact, possible?     
Importantly, these questions pose the same critical challenge to both the pro-union and the pro-
independence models of constitutional change. 
In a similar vein, there are equally critical trade-offs, that are imposed in reality for every constitutional 
model, which derive from the unavoidable limitations on resources.   Given finite resources, including the 
capacity to sustainably borrow, the application of powers that entail significant expenditure will ultimately 
be constrained.  As with policy configurations, so expenditure configurations therefore need to be seen in 
their totality - including what configurations are possible and which are most effective in meeting the 
stated objectives – and in their detail –  again, which specific policies are feasible and most effective.    
Precisely defining the net benefit of any constitutional proposition is, of course, totally unrealistic:  
identifying and aggregating the benefits and costs of any proposition is simply impossible.   This fact 
should not, however, lead to the rejection of the critical qualitative point: we need to understand the 
feasible policy packages that define any constitutional proposition and the likely net value of each of 
these policy configurations.  
5. The Lessons from Europe.   Directly relevant to many of the previous points is the question:  
what have we learned from the traumatic experience of the European Monetary Union over the course of 
the financial crisis and subsequent protracted recession?    
 
Certainly, there have been indications of an emerging consensus – whether we like it or not - of a clear 
need to establish greater economic coordination and collaboration through banking and financial sector 
unions and through fiscal union, as was echoed in the Governor of the Bank of England’s recent 
comments.  Are these apparent lessons directly applicable to a possible sterling monetary union?  And 
what do we also learn from the experience over recent times of other small independent European 
economies that have successfully maintained stable economic systems outwith the EMU and, indeed, 
outwith the EU?  There is much in these questions to understand still. 
 
6. Is there a status quo option?     One little-discussed question has been whether the status 
quo is in fact an option at all?  The Scotland Act (2012) moves Scotland on from the original 1999 
devolution settlement, but it would, for example, appear extremely unlikely that a UK Government would 
not revisit at least two critical elements post-Referendum following a no vote:  firstly, the basic UK 
equalisation question and, secondly, the range of powers that Scotland might assume in addition to 
those defined in the 2012 Act.    
 
The Chief Secretary to the Treasury has recently claimed 
25
 that, since no pro-union party is advocating 
any revision to the Barnett formula, he can reassure the electorate that it will not be amended.  This 
appears to contradict the Liberal Democrat 2010 manifesto
26
.   As ever, there is therefore the question of 
how credible is such a claim in the face of the known opposition from some political groupings and in 
other parts of the UK.  A less likely interpretation of his comments might suggest the continuing use of 
Barnett  - or a broadly similar mechanism - to make annual revisions to the funding flows, while looking 
again at the underlying Needs Approach and the base to which Barnett is applied.  In many ways, this 
seems a more probable way forward and, therefore, makes current claims of a status quo in this regard 
questionable.    
 
Ultimately, the question is:   is the current approach (founded on a considerably dated, underlying Needs 
Approach to equalisation and the marginal adjustments determined through the Barnett formula)  
sustainable or will the pressures for revision be overwhelming?   Any revision would be a very significant 
step away from the status quo.  
  
In addition, as is considered in the subsequent paper in this Commentary (Reflections on the pro-
independence and pro-union contributions to the Fraser Economic Commentary and on the proposals for 
enhanced devolution of economic powers to Scotland), such is the public support for enhanced 
devolution – and the momentum behind the proposals of the three main UK Parties - that it seems 
improbable that, were independence to be rejected, more powers would not be granted to Scotland.   
Moreover, it would be anticipated that the greater the degree of enhanced devolution that is adopted, the 
greater the likely strain on the existing Barnett arrangement and the more likely it is, therefore, to be 
reviewed in a more substantive manner. 
 
7. Irreversibility:   Assessing the Long Term Value of the Constitutional Propositions.  To 
date, the debate has been somewhat casual about what is really of direct interest to a constitutional 
question for which the outcome is presumably a new arrangement that could span decades, if not 
centuries.  Arguably, it is not the capacity of a new arrangement to handle the big current economic 
policy challenges, but rather the capacity to respond to the challenges that might be anticipated over the 
very long term and, indeed, the challenges whose nature and import is absolutely speculative.  The 
central challenge is:  would the new economic system, that is enabled by new powers, display the 
characteristics that we would require to promote a stable and sustainable economy in the face of the 
huge global challenges that might be encountered over the coming decades?    
Six Tests were set out in Goudie (2013), which
 
seeks to focus attention on the major economic questions 
that a new political system – and the economic systems that could be designed within that new politics – 
ought to be able to handle, with a particular emphasis on the longer term
27
.     
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    Goudie (2013):  see chapter 2.   The subject-specific chapters –  all written by highly distinguished experts in their 
field – provide a similar insight:  each concludes with an explicit statement of the critical questions that must be 
confronted in Scotland‟s constitutional debate. 
This is not to dismiss the value of analysing short term challenges and problems and the policy response 
that different constitutional states might facilitate, as these immediate and relatively transitory challenges 
are, of course, one important and tangible test of any new constitutional state.  But they are seriously 
limited as a test of a long term constitutional change.    
There is an important, additional point here:  we should pay close attention to any adjustment or 
transition process from one economic system to another (which is, of course, a separate consideration 
from any short term and temporary economic challenge, such as a recession or banking crisis, that 
happens to be important at a particular point in time).   If adjustment is anticipated to take years or even 
decades, then most people would probably seek long term benefits that are more substantive and more 
certain.   So, the analysis of the long term outcomes is again a key part of this debate. 
The Tests look at how a more structured approach to the assessment of the various constitutional 
proposals is possible, with a particular emphasis on the long term value of the proposals: that is, over the 
time horizon that is most relevant to such a fundamental political transformation. This approach focuses 
only on the economic dimension of the constitutional propositions: it specifically takes no account of an 
array of other factors, whether political or social in nature, for example. There are, of course, many 
instances of different peoples legitimately choosing self-determination and an independence model 
irrespective of any economic arguments that were advanced at the time. 
The Six Tests crystallise the key challenges for Scotland in its economic analysis of potential 
constitutional change.   They are designed to answer the questions: 
 
 how does any proposed constitutional arrangement bear up when evaluated against these 
Tests? 
 is the long-term economic sustainability of the Scottish economy secured under this 
constitutional arrangement, given the exceptional uncertainty and risks that most certainly exist 
when our time horizon is many decades? 
 what are the relative strengths and vulnerabilities of the different proposals? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Six Tests to evaluate proposals for constitutional change. 
1. New Opportunities: 
 Would the proposed political and economic structure bring new economic, social and 
environmental opportunities that do not currently exist? 
 
2. Cyclical compatibility and stability: 
 Are the business cycles and economic structures of the partners in any proposed 
monetary union compatible? How would the implications of incompatibility and the need 
for cyclical stabilisation be managed? 
 
3. Long term competitiveness: 
 How would Scotland promote competitiveness and, if need be, restore competitiveness? 
 
4. Resilience and managing global shocks: 
 Are there well developed means to manage significant global shocks? 
 
5. Risk management and uncertainty: 
 Are the other primary risks and uncertainties of the proposal identified, and are there 
mechanisms through which they could be effectively managed? 
 
6. Summary Test for proposals for constitutional change: 
 Is the proposal fundamentally economically and financially stable? 
 Would the proposal enhance the capacity to promote the primary objectives of economic 
policy? 
 
Source:  Goudie (2013) 
 
 
Tests such as these are - correctly - open to the criticism that they tend to be too mechanistic (which is 
true) and don’t capture all the points (which is true, too, although they should capture the primary points, 
where agreement on these is possible).  On the other hand, they arguably bring some rigour to what can 
otherwise degenerate into a very confusing and unstructured analysis.  This may suit some, of course, 
as it can helpfully obscure the failure to address key issues.   
III Concluding thoughts. 
While the Referendum campaign inevitably will take on an intensely political character as the vote 
approaches, the key economic challenges of all the constitutional options that may emerge arguably 
need to remain sharply defined and be to the fore of the debate. 
Realism about what can and cannot be answered with any precision at this time is equally critical.  Little 
is ultimately to be gained from cavalier assertions lacking any real basis in evidence from either Scotland 
or from the experience of other economies.   In fact, the answers to many key questions are simply 
unknown at this time.   They may depend on institutional structures yet to be negotiated and whose 
precise form is therefore unknowable.  They may depend on the impact of policy choices – facilitated by 
constitutional change that brings with it new powers, either within an independent Scotland or with 
enhanced powers within the UK – where our knowledge is too soft to provide the clarity that we seek.  
Evidence may be lacking or only exist for economies other than Scotland, or new powers and new policy 
simply create an economic system for which we have no history of how individual economic agents and 
businesses might respond.   This is not a failing of analysis:  it is a reality about any non-marginal 
economic policy change that creates a new set of incentives and behaviours that an economy has never 
seen before.  We can – and should – offer the insights that theory and other economies can provide, but 
we cannot know with certainty.   
Thus, there is a simple reality here.  Choices in the Referendum – and, indeed, choices post-
Referendum about the precise detail and form that enhanced devolution or independence might actually 
take – cannot be founded on hard fact and hard evidence, as we might wish.   
Indeed, one striking conclusion would appear to be the importance of acknowledging openly the 
intractability of some challenges and the obvious risks and, instead, providing a focus on the 
management of risk and uncertainty, much as the private sector has done for years.  Risk and 
uncertainty are not per se reasons to forego an opportunity, but a motivation for contingency planning.   
While policy impacts will remain highly uncertain, this does highlight the critical nature of the post-
Referendum phase and the negotiations that will follow around the institutional structures and multilateral 
agreements that will be necessitated by any constitutional change.   
The ultimate challenge is this:  given our incomplete understanding and obvious ignorance of the precise 
form of any constitutional arrangement and the impact of new economic powers that it would bring, do 
the uncertain net benefits of greater economic powers appear to sufficiently outweigh the uncertain net 
benefits of the current powers?    Or is the fact of greater self-determination - necessarily, constrained 
within an integrated global economy -  with all its uncertainties, a strong enough motivation? 
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